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9 Administration, Education, 
and the Question of Trust 
Richard Bates 
A complete absence of trust would prevent [us] from getting up in the 
. 
mormng. 
(Luhmann 1979: 4) 
Trust is ubiquitous. Our world is saturated with trust. OUf everyday 
existence exhibits our trust almost every minute. \Ve trust that the alarm 
clock will go off at the appropriate time; that the light will work; that the 
shower will be warm; that our breakfast will be safe to eat; that public 
transport will get our children safely to school; that other drivers will act 
predictably as we drive to work; that our colleagues will treat us with 
respect; that the organization we work for will be stable and secure; that 
the professionals who look after our health and well-being will be skilted 
and committed; and so on and on. Not that aUf trust is unconditional or 
always warranted, but overwhelmingly for most of us most of the time 
our trust is indeed warranted, which is why we are upset, hurt, angry, and 
disillusioned when that trust turns out to be misplaced. 
Trust, of course, takes many different forms. In the most general sense, 
we trust the society to which we belong to provide security, prosperity, 
wen-being, and opportunity. Societies that do not or cannot be Husted to 
provide such assurances are regarded as failed states. At another level, we 
trust the agencies of government to use their resources efficiently and to 
our advantage, and to be fair and equitable in their dealings with us. At a 
third level, we expect private businesses to deliver the goods and services 
that they say they witl deliver in an honest and dependable way. Again, we 
trust institutions such as hospitals and schools to operate in our best inter-
ests. And, of course, we expect to be able to trust the professionals who 
staff such institutions to have the required skills, motivations, and com-
mitments that will support us. Finally, at the interpersonal (evei, we expect 
that our trust in those with whom we deal on a personal Ievd be warranted, 
respected, and reciprocated. More than this, we also expect there to be 
mechanisms through which breaches of trust can be redressed, be they the 
result of political malpractice, organizational incompetence, fraud~ misrep~ 
resentation, deceit, or~ indeed, physical or emotional violence. 
There has been, however, over recent years, considerable concern over 
whether all this trust is indeed warranted. Onora O)Neill, in her 2002 
BBC Reith Lectures, asked: <Is it true that we have stopped trusting? Has 
untrustworthy action made trust roo risky? Is trust obsolete? (2002: vii). 
Her answer is that the evidence is pretty mixed. While we continue rou-
tinely to trust most of the individuals and organizations we come into con-
tact with, there does seem to be poll-based evidence of increasing levels of 
mistrust in government, business, office-holders, and professionals. More-
over, mass media constantly reporr cases of misplac.ed trust where trust is 
breached by some doctors, some scientists, some companies, some politi-
cians, some teachers, some colleagues. The response, O'Neill suggests~ has 
been to try to eliminate untrustworthy acts by increasing levels of account-
ability, especially in government) public institutions, and the professions. 
Such accountability is directed towards the elimination of untrustworthy 
behaviour through detailed specification of required behaviour coupled 
with heightened levels of reward and sanction. This is particularly true 
of the public sector: (For those of us in the public sector the new account-
ability takes the form of detailed control. An unending stream of new leg-
islation and regulation, memoranda and instructions, guidance and advice 
floods public sector institutions~ (O'Neill 2002: 46}. Moreover: 
The new legislation, regulation and controls are more than fine rhetoric. 
They require detailed conformity to procedures and protocols., detailed 
record-keeping and provision of information in specific formats and suc-
cess in reaching targets. Detailed instructions regulate and prescribe the 
work and performance of health trusts and schools, of universities and 
research councils, of the police force and of social workers. And beyond 
the public sector, increasingly detailed and regulatory requirements also 
bear on companies and the voluntary sector, on self-employed profession-
als and tradesmen. All institutions face new standards of recommended 
accounting practice, more derailed health and safety requirements, in-
creasingly complex employment and pensions legislation, more exacting 
provisions for ensuring non-discriminarion and, of course, proliferating 
complaint procedures. (2002: 46-47) 
Along with these specifications comes an explosion of audit procedures 
where the idea of audit has spilled over from its original context of finance 
into detailed scrutiny of non-financial processes and systems. Indeed, we 
seem to now be living in what Michael Power (1997) calls 'The Audit 
Society'. The rote of government in particular seems to have changed in 
its emphasis on increased steering capacity. The idea of an independent 
public service devoted to the long-term public interest has been replaced 
by a politicized public service directed towards the delivery of short~term 
objectives that follow from the 'mandates' of governments despite low turn-
outs and the relative brevity of electoral cycles. Such demands for increased 
steering capacity are made clear by the development of strict line man-
agement coupled with heavy sanctions such as that instituted by Michael 
Barber through his imposition of 'deliverology' in education as elsewhere 
during the Blair government in the UK (Barber 2007; 70ff.). 
The result is that in order to control the untrustworthy behaviour of 
some departments, institutions, professionals, businesses, and administra-
tors, and to ensure compliance with government policy, systems are set 
up that implicitly regard all such departments} institutions, professionals, 
businesses, and administrators as potentially untrustworthy and likely to 
subvert or ignore government policy through the exercise of independent 
professional judgment. But such rules, no matter how elaborate, cannot 
account for all possible occurrences and may result in frequent constraints 
on the exercise of appropriate professional judgment in particular situa-
tions. Again, rules devised by differing agencies with mandates directed 
towards differing objectives may require inconsistent behaviours or co(~ 
lectively result in overload and what Art Wise (1979) called 'hyper-ratio-
nalisation', where individual requirements may be rational but collectively 
produce huge cognitive dissonance and exhaustion among practitioners 
and clients alike. 
Such demands for 'performativity' (Ball 1990; Marshall 1999) also serve 
to reorient professional practice away from responding to the needs of cli-
ents towards satisfying administrative demands and targets and the reduc-
tion of 'risk'. This reorientation is experienced by professionals and clients 
alike as both 'distorting the proper aims of professional practice' and as 
"damaging professional pride and integrity> (O;Neill 2002: 50). Moreover, 
the imposition of strict targets and indicators coupled with the sticks and 
carrots of incentive systems may have quite perverse effects: 
Even those who devise the indicators know that they are at very best 
surrogates for the real objectives. Nobody after all seriously thinks that 
numbers of exam passes are the only evidence of good teaching, or 
crime dear-up rates are the only evidence of good policing. Some ex-
ams are easier, others are harder; some crimes easy to dean up, others 
are harder. However, the performance indicators have a deep effect on 
professional and institutional behaviour. If a certain A-level [examina-
tion] board offers easier examinations in a subject, schools have reason 
to choose that syllabus even if it is educationally inferior. If waiting lists 
can be reduced faster by concentrating on certain medical procedures l 
hospitals have reason to do so, even if medical priorities differ. Perverse 
incentives are real incentives. (O'Neill 2002: 55} 
Such systems, directed as they are towards guarantees of trustworthiness 
and performance, can become sources of decreased trust as professionals 
redirect their attention to <incentives to which they have been required to 
respond rather than pursuing the intrinsic requirements for being good 
nurses and teachers, good doctors and police officers, good lecturers and 
social workers' (O'Neill 2002: 56). Much of current mistrust of institu-
tions, systems~ organizations) and professionals arises from just such 
requirements and the concomitant displacement of attention away from 
individual needs and professional judgment. Indeed, attempts to ensure 
the administration of trust seem, frequently and perversely, to result in the 
diminution of trust. 
EDUCATION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST 
The humanist tradition in education saw education as the pursuit of ide-
als such as personal autonomy and emancipation. From~ Rousseau~ Pesta-
Iozzi, Montessori, Hume, Mill, Smith, Arnotd, Marx, and Dewey onwards, 
the avowed purpose of education was to be liberation: personal) social, 
economic. While governments justified the expansion of public systems in 
terms of education)s civilizing mission, the moral education of the POOf, or 
the provision of basic functional literacy) the great educational reformers 
of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries proclaimed the 
purpose of education as the meeting of individual needs. The orientation of 
schools was, therefore (and despite Mr. Gradgrind), towards concern with 
the needs of individual pupils and to the extent that they fulfilled this objec-
tive, they could be trusted. 
Pedagogy devefoped in ways that served this objective. It mediated the 
world of knowledge, of science, of art] and of the social virtues in ways 
that provided access to, or at least a toehold in, the wider world. It pro-
vided a more or less trustworthy account of that world and prepared pupils 
through appropriate knowledge and behaviour to join <the conversation 
of mankind' (Oakeshott 1962). This broad pedagogy was administered 
through the codification of knowledge (curriculum), the rules of engage-
ment (classroom processes), and the assessment of performance {classifica-
tion}. To the extent that such pedagogy was appropriately managed in ways 
that pupils, parents, and the wider pubic respected, it is possible to regard 
it as a mechanism for the administration of trust. Such trust inhered in 
the links between such pedagogy and the everyday experience, social rela-
tions, and personal realization that formed what Habermas (1984) called 
the ~life-wodd; of individuals. 
However, as Lyotard (1984) and Habermas (1975) point out, such an 
orientation becomes subverted in the modern world by mechanisms that 
subordinate sllch ideals to the demands of social efficiency and the ~system'. 
These demands, demands for 'performativity" require schools to implement 
an alternative pedagogy directed, not towards individual development and 
emancipation, or what Nussbaum (2003) and Sen (1999) call 'capabilities~, 
but towards the development of specific skills. These are of two kinds: (a) 
those that contribute to the ability of a country to compete in competitive 
world markets; and (b) those that contribute to internal social cohesion and 
political legitimation. 
Thus, education is not to pursue or to produce ideals, or to provide 
an elite capable of guiding a society or nation towards emancipation 
but, instead, to Isupply the system with players capable of acceptably 
fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions' 
(Lyotard 1984: 5-7). (Marshall 1999~ 310) 
The issue of trust also becomes transformed from its administration through 
curricular~ classroom, and classification processes directed towards the life~ 
world and individual and collective emancipation into its replacement by an 
administration of official requirements directed towards market posItion 
and political controL Such transformation produces what Habermas (fol~ 
lowing Luhmann 1979) calls a ~(egitimation crisis', This crisis is essentially 
one of trust. 
In education this currendy takes the form of conflict between what 
Bernstein (2000) calls the pedagogical recontexrualizing field (PRF) and 
the official recontexruaIizing field (ORF). The PRF takes knowledge from 
activities such as physics and, through the selection of specialized knowl-
edge, the specification of its relation to other forms of knowledge, and 
the sequence and pace of its presentation, recontextualizes such knowl~ 
edge pedagogically. Carpentry becomes woodwork~ for instance_ For the 
first half of the twentieth century the PRF was heavily influenced by the 
humanistic ideals of the Progressive Education movement. Teachers and 
schools were allowed considerable autonomy in their practices while gov-
ernment was mainly concerned with expanding tbe provision of education 
in response to political demands for access to secondary and then tertiary 
education. From the middle of the century, however, as government expen-
ditures rose, governments of aU persuasions took an increasing interest in 
what James Callaghan in his Ruskin College speech called 'the secret gar-
den of the curriculum' {Lawton 1980). In this speech) Callaghan declared 
that schools were being run by 'unaccountable teachers" teaching an irrel-
evant curriculum to young workers who were poorly motivated, illiterate 
and innumerate' and that ~there is no virtue in producing socially well-
adjusted members of society who are unemployed because they do not have 
the skills' (Carr and Hartnett 1996: 107). 
The thesis here is essentially that professionals, specificaHy teachers; can-
not be trusted. The resulting 'discourse of derision' (Wallace 1993) became 
widespread in political circles during the last three decades of the twentieth 
century, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US (under Rea-
gan and Bush)) the United Kingdom {under Thatcher), and Australia (under 
Howard). But such a discourse not only attacked the trustworthiness of 
teachers, it also paved the way for the imposition of strict specification 
and accountability mechanisms designed to reduce the relative autonomy 
of teachers and replace it with an official pedagogy [hat demanded compli~ 
ance with a centrally determined curriculum, high-stakes testing, devolved 
responsibility for performance, and a quasi-competitive market in educa-
tional provision where increased ~privare' competition was supported with 
public funds (Ball 2007; Berliner and Biddle 1995; Bonnor and Caro 2007; 
Glass 2008). 
The educational market created through privatization and competition, 
coupled with the accountabiFty movement and high-stakes testing} both 
reduced trust in the capacity of many schools to deliver either a broad edu-
cation or positional advantage and also ~had a devastating effect on pub-
lic education .. _ destroying the richness of a curriculum that has taken 
decades to develop ... obliterating the professional autonomy of teachers 
and ... dimming the personal hopes and dreams of hundreds of thousands 
of children' (Glass 2008: 18). 
The new official discourse restructured the functions of school manage-
ment (BaH 1990; Berliner and Biddle 1995; Grace 1995), turning it away 
from internal concerns with pedagogy, instructional leadership, and profes-
sional development towards external concerns with league tables, reputa-
tion, competition, and prestige, that is, with comparative performance on 
mandated tests. As Bernstein observes: 
The management structure's major focus is upon the school's perfor~ 
mance, with regard to attracting and retaining students, their conduct 
and their attainments ... The management structure has become the 
device for creating an entrepreneurial competitive culture. The latter is 
responsible for criteria informing senior appointments and the engag-
ing or hiring of specialised staff to promote the effectiveness of its cul-
ture. Thus there is a dislocation between the culture of the pedagogic 
discourse and management culture. (2000: 61) 
The result is: 
a culture and a context to facilitate the survival of the fittest as judged 
by market demands. The focus is on the short term rather than the long 
term, upon the exploration of vocational applications rather than upon 
exploration of knowledge. The transmission here views knowledge as 
money. And like money it should flow easily to where demand calls. 
There must be no impediments to flow. Personal commitment and 
particular dedication of staff and students are regarded as resistances;. 
as oppositions to the free circulation of knowledge. And so personal 
commitments, inner dedications, not only are not encouraged, but are 
also regarded as equivalent to monopolies in the market, and like such 
monopolies~ should be dissolved. The ... position constructs an out-
wardly responsive identity rather than one driven by inner dedication. 
Contract replaces covenant. (2000: 69) 
This transformation of curriculum~ pedagogy~ and assessment, and the 
concomitant imposition of a manageriaflsm that establishes centralized 
control over objectives while devolving responsibility for success or failure, 
has led to a narrowing of both objectives and opportunity and an exclusion 
of concerns with promoting social justice. As Bernstein suggests, the new 
official pedagogy is based; 
on a new concept of 'work' and 'life' which might be called 'short-ter~ 
mism'. This is where a skill, task or area of work, undergoes continu-
ous development, disappearance or replacement; where life experience 
cannot be based on stab(e expectations of the future and one~s location 
in it. Under these circumstances it is considered that a vital new abil~ 
ity must be developed: 'trainability', the ability to profit from continu-
ous pedagogic re-formations and so cope with the new requirements of 
'work' and ~life'. (2000: 58) 
Trainability is, however} central to a conception of individuals as workers 
whose skins are more vital than their identities. Indeed, identity is transitory 
as successive skill sets are mastered and discarded, leaving no permanent 
core. As Bernstein suggests, 'There seems to be an emptiness in the concept 
of trainability, an emptiness which makes the concept self-referentia{ and 
thus excluding' (2000: 59). 
The transitory and ':empty~ nature of identity in such circumstances is 
argued by some to be the result of conditions of modernity. Touraine sum-
marizes this view: 
We are now faced with the task of understanding a society in which 
change seems to be the primary factor, and in which there seem to be 
no limits to change. Accelerated technological change, together with 
the globalization of production, consumption and communications has 
finally convinced us that nothing is settled anymore. Social life is no 
longer constructed around any central principle. Social utility, rational-
ization and even the dass struggle are things of the past. If change is 
everything, how can there be norms, laws or a social definition of good 
and evil? (2000: 141) 
Touraine's answer to this problem is to emphasize the importance of agency 
within the context of a universal principle of equal respect as a foundation 
for social justice. 
Sen (1999) takes a similar position in response to this situation in his 
insistence on the intimate connection between individual agency (freedom} 
and social commitment: 
individual agency is, u[timatefy~ central to addressing ... deprivations. 
On the other hand, the freedom of agency that we individually have 
is inescapably qualified and constrained by the social, political and 
economic opportunities thar are available to us. There is a deep com-
plementarity between individual agency and social arrangements. It is 
important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality of indi-
vidual freedom and to the force of social influences on the extent and 
reach of individual freedom. To counter the problems that we face,. we 
have to see individual freedom as a social commitment. (xi-xii) 
Social justice is, then, in Sen's view~ a matter of arranging our social com-
mitments in ways that enhance individual freedom to live a valued life: 
in analysing social justice, there is a strong case for judging individual 
advantage in terms of the capabilities that a person has~ that is, the 
substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life that he or 
she has reason to value. (1999: 87) 
Capabilities) and the enhancement of individual capabilities through social 
arrangements, are at the heart of the issue of social justice. Sen offers five 
~types of freedom' or capabilities as being fundamentaL These indude: 
political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency 
guarantees, and protective security (1999: 10). It follows that an educa~ 
ti011 directed towards the development of individual agency supported by 
such capabilities would not be constrained by an official pedagogy solely 
directed towards the production of transitory skills suitable for particular 
market condttions. It might also be an education that could be trusted. 
LEADERSHIP, CAPABILITIES, AGENCY, AND TRUST 
Since the 19805 there has been a growing atrempt in the literarure to recon-
nect educational ideals with educational leadership and to recover from 
the almost complete separation of educational and administrative theory 
(Bates 1980). Moreover, some of the literature has taken up the challenge to 
see educational leadership as the management of knowledge and to explore 
the nature of the power relations that structure the selection of knowledge 
{curriculum), the means of transmission (pedagogy), and the evaluative sys-
tems (examinations} present in schools (Bares 1980). The issue of power, 
the power to control the message systems of schools and the opportunities 
that they resent or deny, is central to the exercise of leadership and the issue 
of trust. 
For instance, where management is exercised through manipuiation or 
coercion it is unIikefy that teachers will trust the principal or the wider 
management of the school or school system. Such manipulation may, of 
course, be visible and systematic in terms of the award of incentives or 
punishments, praise or blame. Or it may be invisible or exploitative as in 
the current emphasis on the role of the principal in <establishing~ a school 
culture that conforms to his or her 'vision' (Hargreaves 1994; Bates 2006, 
forthcoming). Trust is unlikely in such circumstances. 
For trust to be established, it is suggested that two fundamental condi-
tions must be met; 'people must find one another highly predictable and 
share substantially the same aims' (Nias et al. 1989: 78}. This is more likely 
where schools serve relatively homogeneous communities where there is a 
consonance of culture, values, and objectives between management, teach-
ers, pupils, and parents. In such circumstances 'schools of virtue' may 
emerge where there is a <shared covenant' {Sergiovanni 1992}. Such schools 
are interesting in that while they may well consolidate trust among their 
members, such trust may well be gained at the price of distrust of those 
who are not members of their virtuous community. As Peshkin remarked 
in his study of a religiolls school that clearly met Sergiovanni's definition of 
a school of virtue with a shared covenant: 
The academy ... serves an internaHy integrative or community-main-
tenance function. That is, it simultaneously links believers together and 
separates them from non-believers. In its defensive capacity, rhe acad-
emy shields its students from competitors by promoting dichotomies 
not only of we and they, but also of right and wrong. We follow God's 
truth in God's preferred institution: they are the unfortunates of Sa-
tan~s dark, unrighteous world. (1986: 282) 
Moreover, in the case of many religious schools there is a problematic 
conflation of trust in exclusive beliefs with an authoritarian insistence on 
the rightness of those particular beliefs. Such authoritarian approaches 
are clearly incompatible with a conception of education as emancipation 
and, in a narrower sense, incompatible with the notion of religious free-
dom. Ironically, the claim of such schools to pursue their authoritarian and 
exclusive education freely is based upon a denial of religious freedom, for 
such religious schools: 
constitute an impediment to student's enjoyment of freedom of reli-' 
gion insofar as they stifle any inclination students have to question the 
religious beliefs of their parents' community or to discuss or act on 
beliefs relating to religion that are different from the schools' span"sors. 
(Dwyer 1998: 163) 
The question arises then as to how much trust could be placed in such 
schools by the wider community or whether such schools might indeed 
serve to encourage mistrust-particularly mistrust of communities of dif-
ference" be [hey religious, political, cultural, or racial. Moreover, such mis-
trust might well be encouraged by authoritarian practices that would not 
be tolerated in other circumstances. 
Stephen Law iHustrares this point by his imagining of the establishment 
of <politicaF schoots that would be open only ro children of parents with 
particular political persuasions (nea-conservative, Trotskyist, socialist, 
Stalinist) communitarian~ etc,). Such schools, he argues) would increase 
'choice' for parents and would presumably meet Sergiovanni's criteria for 
'schools of virtue; where parents and schools enter into a specific covenant 
based on shared beliefs. Law describes the practices of such schools: 
Political education at these schools largely takes the form of indoc-
trination. Portraits of their political leaders beam beatifically down 
from classroom walls. Each day begins with the collective singing of 
a political anthem. Pupils are never encouraged to think critiCally and 
independently about politica1 questions. They are expected to defer 
rnore-or~less unquestioningly to their schoors Authority and its revered 
political texts. Only ideas approved by the school's political Authority 
are taught. Children are never exposed to alternative political points of 
view {except, perhaps, in a rather caricatured form, so that they can be 
all the more sweepingly dismissed}. (2006! 169-70) 
As Law suggests, were such partisan 'political~ schools to be established 
there would be public outrage and demands that the government ensure that 
schools expose children toa range of political views and encourage children 
to think critically and freely about" them. Parenta[ <freedom' to choose would 
be overridden on the basis thar no one could trust those schools to teach 
more broadly appropriate values that would SUppOTt both the polltical free-
doms of the broader community and its political cohesion. 
Why, asks Law, if this is our attitude to the imaginary 'political' 
schools, do we not take the same attitude to religious schools? But the 
issue is surely even broader than this and involves the question of how we 
can trust schools that seem to incorporate certain interests and exclude 
others-schools that are partisan and exclusive in their practices rather 
than democratic and inclusive. 
This is a question that is becoming more urgent as the complexity of con-
temporary societies increases, for 'trust is especially important for organiza-
tions that operate in turbulent external environments, that depend heavily 
on information sharing for success, and whose work processes demand 
effective decentralized decision-making' (Bryk and Schneider 2002: 33). 
Such are the conditions of schools and school systems. 
One official response to the issue of trust has been to increase account-
ability and, as indicated earlier, [his may well have had results that have 
diminished rrust~especially between teachers and systems. The second 
key official response has been to endorse and encourage t.choice~ in the 
belief that competition would increase school diversity and performance as 
wel1 as better match parental values with school character. In England, for 
instance, the official policy acknowledged that: 
We know that not all schools are the same. They have different strengths 
and serve different communities. We must encourage and celebrate this 
diversity. AU schools need to develop their own ethos and sense of mis-
sion. {Department for Education and Skills 2002: 13} 
Moreover, in England official policy encouraged this diversity by increased 
funding for 'faith' schools (Gardner, Cairns, and Lawton 2005) as weB 
as the establishment of Academies (Beckett 2007), despite evidence that 
parents are less than enthusiastic: fewer than 1 per cent support the idea of 
faith groups running schools and fewer than 5 per cent private companies 
and charities ('What Do Parents Want?' 2009: 52). 
Here, again there is also a divergence between intention and effect, for: 
Despite the grand promises issued by those promoting market-based 
reform of social institutions-that we will witness increased levels of 
diversity} participation and equality~what has happened in the prac-
tice of market reform is a heightening of the inequitable hierarchical 
relationships that are characteristic of capitalist systems. (Forsey 2007: 
158-59)' 
The result for teachers, pupils, and parents alike is not trust, but alienation 
from a situation where they are 'being forced to surrender their agency to a 
reified system that many feel powerless to change' (Forsey 2007: 163). 
The issue of power and control is central to the issue of trust. Where edu-
cation systems and their schools deny agency on the part of teachers, pupils, 
and parents, trust is likely to be in short supply. This is especially so where 
such agency is proclaimed through ~Iocal parental control', for instance, 
but denied by the accountability mechanisms enforced by central agencies 
through complaisant managers (Forsey 2007). Trust is similarly threarened 
where promises of 'choice' are made but where significant numbers of par-
ents do not get their first choice or are prohibited by cost or distance from 
accessing the school of their choice. Again, the promise of the replacement 
of <failing schools' under such initiatives as the 'Fresh Starr' programme in 
England) by new schools centred on a 'culture of success' produced through 
strong leadership may, in reality, both meet the official criteria and fait 
significant groups of students. Araujo., for instance, in a study of transition 
from the <failing~ Millhaven High to the 'Fresh Start~ Greenfield School, 
shows how the pursuit of official standards worked against the interests of 
refugee children: 
According to several OFSTED reports~ there had been 'very good re-
sults' amongst refugee children due to the quality of the work being 
carried out at Millhaven High, a school committed to raising the aspi~ 
rations of a community where attainment was traditionally low. This 
past experience was erased in the transition to the Fresh Started school, 
UC::'!-'lLC LIle :'l~llll.l(;aEll prU]?Ufll()ll VI lSUCfil pUpUS ... I.Jreenneia was 
creating an identity based on 'traditional' approaches, through the po-
licing of teachers' work~ strict discipline and increased selection within 
the school, favouring the 'more able'. (2009: 613) 
Similar problems arose in the establishment of the lavishly funded (and 
privatized) City Academy programme. Such academies were supposed to 
be beacons of hope built in the most depressed districts of English cities 
and, through strong leadership and a culture of success~ to revolutionize 
the educational attainments of disadvantaged youth. Despite lavish finan-
cial support~ cutting-edge design, and specialized recrujtment practices~ 
such schools in fact showed little improvement in attainment of their pupils 
despite their advantages. They did, however, through selective entry and 
the exclusion of unsatisfactory pupils (for both disciplinary and {perfor~ 
mance' issues~an option not open to public schools), have a significantly 
depressing effect on adjacent non-selective and inadequately funded public 
schools (Beckett 2007). Parents find it difficult to trust systems and schools 
that impose such iHUSqfY managerial solutions (Beckett 2007). As Araujo 
observes, 'managerial solutions are not sufficient to deal with problems that 
are both educational and social' (2009: 612). 
DIVERSITY, A CULTURE OF COMMITMENT, 
AND SCHOOLS OF HOPE 
Educational and social problems are inextricably linked. Moreover, as soci-
eties become more complex and differentiated, the social issue of how we 
live together becomes the most pressing social and educational problem 
(Bates 2005; Touraine 2000). The 'market' solution to this problem seems 
likely to hierarchize differences, thereby increasing the economic, cultural, 
social, and geographical distance between such groups. A competitive mar-
ketized education system that hierachizes schools, pupils, teachers, and 
managers in ways that confer various levels of distinction (or the lack of it) 
may more or less efficiently allocate its graduates into 'appropriate' loca-
tions in various hierarchies, but is unlikely to provide much assistance in 
reconciling different groups to the task of living together (Bourdieu 1984; 
Touraine 2000). 
Such a system can only be maintained by the exercise of coercive power, 
through administration by control (Rowan 1990). 
Administration by control implies the imposition by a hierarchical 
structure of authority, of a means~end rationality that not only assumes 
uniform agreement on goals, but also uniform methodologies to achieve 
these goals. Administration by control represents a simplistic applica-
tion of [he factory metaphor to schooling. (Starratr 2003: 197-98) 
approach that takes account of difference. 
Rowan (1990) suggested that there may be a more effective strategy for 
administering a school~ which he called administration through com-
mitment. In schools that are run by commitment rather than control} 
there is an entirely dlf£erent dynamic at work. In these schools there 
is still a concern with schoolwide goals as well as learning outcOmes. 
However, the assumptions and beliefs behind administration by com-
mitment are quite different. Within the teaching faculty there is a much 
greater awareness of diversity and difference among the student body. 
Teachers assume the need for flexibility in teaching protocols, pacing, 
and the performance of the learning that will be accepted as indicators 
of mastery. There is the belief that one can teach many things simul~ 
taneously, that on any given day students roay be more disposed to 
learn than on others; that cultural pluralism in the classroom requires 
sensitivity to a variety of meanings generated by dassroom activities; 
and that along with academic learning there are many social lessons to 
be learned such as how to respect racial, ethnic and sexual differences; 
how to negotiate disagreements; learning how to control antisocial im-
pulses; learning how to listen to and appreciate another point of view 
and enrich on~>s understanding with those other perspectives. (Starratt 
2003: 198) 
Schools built on such administrative principles would look very different 
from those demanded by market accountability. Their ideal would be a cos-
mopolitanism built on the recognition and valuing of difference within the 
context of a critical pedagogy which opened up differences to examination 
and negotiation and allowed students the freedom to argue for and adopt a 
way of life possibly different from that which they inherited but which they 
can defend as a valuable and valued choice (Touraine 2000). Moreover, as 
Bottery (2004) argues) the education provided by such schools needs to 
be framed within the context of a concern with global ecological~ social, 
and cultural issues. Such an education would not only connect individu-
als and cultural groups, and encourage their reformatIon in a contempo~ 
rary context, but would also connect students with the forces shaping their 
future world and allow them to actively pursue their place within it. Such 
an education would provide for both respect and agency that could form 
the foundation for a broader trust in schools, teachers as professionals, 
and the management of schools and school systems. It would) however, 
demand that expectations and practices of schools be ~reframed in terms of 
a cultural struggle for the meaning of school learning and for personal and 
collective futures' (Wrigley 2003: 183). 
Such principles might well provide the foundation for what Wrigley 
(2003) caBs 'Schools of Hope'. The resultant agenda would look markedly 
different from the administration by control that pervades the current com-
petitive market structures of schooling. It would be an agenda informed by 
a new sense of leadership through which trust might be renewed: 
\Y/e need a sense of leadership as direction finding, not just capacity 
building. We need a fuBer sense of the transformative leadership which 
connects up with dynamic social transformation. We need to turn 
around our schools until they engage with the contradictions} hopes 
and fears of local communities. We need a sense of achievement which 
looks beyond the accumulation of factual knowledge, which links 
hand) heart and mind and involves moral engagement with the whole 
of humanity. We need new concepts of intelligence~distributed, emo-
tional, cultural~ political~which involves our engagement in shaping 
the future of our planet ... We will have to rethink education, and not 
simply 'improve' schools. (Wrigley 2003: 182-83) 
An educational leadership based upon such cosmopolitan principles; 
respectful of equity in diversity; committed to cultural negotiation, to eco-
logical awareness, to fairness in educational and social arrangements, to 
the development of broadly based capabilities; and conscious of our collec-
tive fu[ure might well be a leadership that wou(d be deserving of the trust 
of teachers, parents, pupils, and citizens. 
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